

KETJE and KEYAK

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Outline

- 1 Overview
- 2 KEYAK
- 3 KETJE
- 4 Conclusions and Current Developments

Overview

- Inspired by KECCAK and DUPLEX
- KEYAK targeting high performances
 - Using reduced-round KECCAK- f [1600] or KECCAK- f [800]
 - Optionally parallelizable
- KETJE targeting lightweight
 - Using reduced-round KECCAK- f [400] or KECCAK- f [200]

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Two approaches

KEYAK:

- DUPLEXWRAP
- A (strong) permutation
 - fixed #rounds
- Block-oriented
- Cryptanalysis
 - permutation-level

KETJE:

- MONKEYWRAP
- A (thin) round function
 - #rounds in phases
- Stream-oriented
- Cryptanalysis
 - round function + construction

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KEYAK goals

- **Nonce-based AE function**
- 128-bit security (incl. multi-target)
- Sequence of header-body pairs
 - keeping the state during the session
- Optionally parallelizable
- Using reduced-round KECCAK-f[1600] or KECCAK-f[800], to allow
 - implementation re-use
 - cryptanalysis re-use
 - reasonable side-channel protections

(... and because we like it ...)

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
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Duplex layer




KECCAK- p [1600, $n_r = 12$] or KECCAK- p [800, $n_r = 12$]

DUPLEXWRAP layer

DUPLEXWRAP

- is a nonce-based authenticated encryption mode;
- works on sequences of header-body pairs.



$A^{(1)}$ contains the key and must be unique, e.g.,


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
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
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


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
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Inside DUPLEXWRAP



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KEYAK instances and efficiency

Name	Width b	Parallelism P
OCEAN KEYAK	1600	4
SEA KEYAK	1600	2
LAKE KEYAK	1600	1
RIVER KEYAK	800	1

- Processing for LAKE KEYAK
 - long messages: about 50 % of SHAKE128
 - short messages: 24 rounds
- Working memory footprint
 - reasonable on high- and middle-end platforms
 - not ideal on constrained platforms

Security of KEYAK

Generic security of KEYAK thanks to a combination of results:

- Sound tree hashing modes [IJIS 2013] for parallelized modes
- Keyed sponge indistinguishability [SKEW 2011 + work in progress]
- SPONGEWRAP generic security [SAC 2011], adapted to DUPLEXWRAP

Safety margin against shortcut attacks:

- Practical attacks up to 6 rounds [Dinur et al. SHA-3 2014]
- Academic attacks up to 9 rounds [Dinur et al. SHA-3 2014]

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
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KETJE goals

- Nonce-based AE function
- 96-bit or 128-bit security (incl. multi-target)
- Sequence of header-body pairs
 - keeping the state during the session
- Small footprint
- Target niche: secure channel protocol on secure chips
 - banking card, ID, (U)SIM, secure element, FIDO, etc.
 - secure chip has strictly incrementing counter
- Using reduced-round KECCAK- $f[400]$ or KECCAK- $f[200]$, to allow
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
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Inside KETJE: the MONKEYDUPLEX layer



- $n_{start} = 12$ rounds should provide strong instance separation
- $n_{step} = 1, r = 2b/25$ should avoid single-instance state retrieval
- $n_{stride} = 6$ rounds should avoid a forgery with one instance

Inside MONKEYWRAP



KETJE instances and lightweight features

feature		KETJE JR	KETJE SR
state size		25 bytes	50 bytes
block size		2 bytes	4 bytes
processing		computational cost	
initialization	per session	12 rounds	12 rounds
wrapping	per block	1 round	1 round
8-byte tag comp.	per message	9 rounds	7 rounds

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Current developments

- Optimized software implementations
 - Gross estimations can be derived from KECCAK
 - LAKE KEYAK expected twice faster than SHAKE128
 - There might be interesting improvement with new AVX512 (VPTERNLOG, rotations and 32 registers)
- Hardware implementations

Conclusions

Thanks for your attention!

